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Many studies have sought to identify demographic and dispositional factors rendering some 
individuals more prone to fraud victimization than others, with conclusions varying across 
different fraud types. Building from a Fundamental Motives Framework, this study investigates 
the effect of mating motives on risk-seeking and impulsiveness as risk factors for fraud 
victimization, focusing on effect differences between young adults and old adults. The results 
from a between-group experiment do not show enough evidence to support neither increased 
impulsiveness and risk-taking, and therefore, increased victimization likelihood, nor 
differences in the influence of a mating frame of mind between young and old adults. 
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Every year, millions of consumers become victims of one or more types of fraud with 
many experiencing multiple incidents of the same fraud. With the advent of technology, the 
dissemination of fraudulent and misleading information has been made relatively easy as 
perpetrators are now able to reach potential victims across geographical divides.  The internet, 
particularly, has increased scammers’ attempts to persuade consumers to behave online in ways 
conductive of financial or other malicious exploitation (Williams et al.,2017). Fraud schemes 
are very costly to consumers and societies at large. According to the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, in 2008, personal losses reached almost $1b among victimized Australian 
individuals, and the Australian community lost $8.5b due to consumer fraud (Smith & Budd, 
2008).   In the United States, direct annual costs of fraud amount to $40 - $50 billion, this is 
excluding money spent to prevent it and other indirect costs such as time lost (Deevy et al., 
2012). Victims of such schemes do not only suffer financial, but also significant psychological 
distress (Deevy et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2017). Understanding the nature of the risk factors 
is crucial in order for regulatory and consumer protection agencies to adjust and, therefore, 
maximize the effects of their anti-fraud measures, thus reducing successful consumer 
victimization. Nonetheless, there is lack of conclusive studies regarding the factors that lead 
some consumers to be more susceptible to fraud than others. This paper takes a new approach 
and applies an evolutionary perspective building upon the Fundamental Motives Framework.  
The evolutionary psychology perspective makes a clear distinction between proximate 
or immediate and fundamental motivation behind a certain behavior. It poses that consumers’ 
choices and preferences are more deeply rooted in psychological adaptations with regards to 
solving social challenges passed on by our ancestors. There exists scientific evidence for 
specialized human psychological systems for managing different evolutionary challenges, 
which encompass evasion of physical harm, avoidance of disease, friendship building, status 
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attainment, mate acquisition, mate retention, and caring for family (Griskevicius & Kenrick, 
2013). These are in the core of the Fundamental Motives Framework. A fundamental motive 
can be triggered by external or internal cues signaling threats or opportunities regarding a given 
evolutionary challenge. There are systematic differences in how one behaves in order to fulfil 
these different motives and a solution to one challenge may hinder the solution to another 
(Griskevicius & Kenrick, 2013). For instance, while trusting can help make friends, it can also 
increase risk of being physically harmed.  
One important implication of the Fundamental Motives Framework is that ultimate 
motives can alter decision-making processes, thus helping to explain the nature of decision 
biases end errors. Hence, behaviors regarded as irrational in other domains, may be considered 
design features from an evolutionary perspective (Griskevicius & Kenrick, 2013). Such is the 
case of loss aversion, discussed later in this paper. Moreover, despite all humans having the 
same evolutionary motives, the effects of each motive on one’s decision-making process is 
expected to differ across individuals depending on different factors such current life stage 
(Griskevicius and Kenrick, 2013). From an evolutionary perspective, there are three different 
life stages each associated with solving different evolutionary challenges and, therefore, with 
the activation of different motivational systems. The self-protection system is activated early in 
the somatic growth stage, which lasts from birth to puberty. The mate acquisition system 
emerges in the beginning of the mating stage, which lasts from puberty to parenthood. In the 
parenting stage, including grand parenting in humans, the mate retention and kin care systems 
are activated. Griskevicius & Kenrick (2013) suggest that at different life stages, people are 
more sensitive to different motivational systems, which come with a set of behaviors and 
decision-making processes that dictate one’s reaction to a presented cue. For instance, teenagers 
and young adults might be more impacted by a mate-acquisition motive given its importance 
during the mate-acquisition stage. Contrarily, they may be less influenced by the self-protection 
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motive because attracting mates often drives them to seek out danger (Griskevicius & Kenrick, 
2013). By contrast, those in the parenting stage are likely to be more concerned with their safety 
and health in order to raise their offspring and, therefore, might be more influenced by the self-
protection motive and less by the mate-acquisition system (Griskevicius and Kenrick, 2013). 
Building from Griskevicius and Kenrick’s (2013) previous work, I investigate the effect 
of the mate-acquisition motive on fraud victimization. Since this motive has been shown to 
increase impulsivity and risk-taking, which have been linked to increased victimization, I 
hypothesize that a mate-acquisition motive increases victimization likelihood.  Particular focus 
is given to age differences in order to contribute to the literature from this evolutionary 
approach. Since it was suggested that the mate-acquisition motive has higher influence on 
teenagers and young adults,  given that they are in the mating life stage, I hypothesize that 
young adults will be more impulsive and risk-seeking and, therefore, more vulnerable to fraud 
than old adults. Then, this study can inform optimal targeting for consumer fraud prevention 
policies and measures such as awareness campaigns and educational programs. For instance, 
scams where mating cues may be present, such as dating scams, may be more effectively 
diffused if prevention measures are targeted to young adults who may be more likely to take 
risks and act impulsively without regarding the legitimacy of the situation. In case of students, 
for example, identification of scams they are more susceptible to may be implemented in their 
curriculums. As vulnerability to victimization is also complicated by how much one is targeted, 
I also explore whether young adults are more likely to be targeted than old adults. In the scope 
of the current study, fraud is the deliberate deception of victims with promises of unnecessary, 
grossly misrepresented, never intended to be provided, or nonexistent goods, services, or other 
benefits (Johnson (2004) in Schoepfer and Piquero, 2009).  
Literature Review 
• Fraud Victimization and Age 
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There is a general misconception that older consumers are more susceptible to fall 
victim to fraud that stems from previous anecdotal evidence (Pak & Shadel, 2007). However, 
the current literature provides mixed conclusions about whether younger or older people, and 
which age groups in general, have a higher likelihood of being victimized, especially when 
looking into specific types of fraud. 
In one of the pioneering studies on the correlation of age with fraud victimization, Titus 
et al. (1995) found a negative correlation between age and fraud victimization. They found that 
younger individuals are three times more likely to suffer losses as they are more likely to be 
approached (in Anderson, 2016; in Deevy et al., 2012). In a random sample of 400 from a 
telephone survey, Wyk and Benson (1997) also found that younger individuals do have a higher 
likelihood of being fraud targets. However, the researchers did not find a correlation between 
age and successful victimization. Similarly, Wyk and Mason (2001), found a higher likelihood 
of experiencing consumer fraud victimization attempts in younger consumers and no significant 
correlation between age and successful victimization. Nevertheless, they found that risk of 
consumer victimization decreased with age, being 18 to 24-year-olds at higher risk than 35 to 
44-year-olds who were at higher risk than 65 to 74-year-olds. A survey conducted by the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 2011 found that, except for fraudulent prize promotions, 
victimization rates in the various groups of fraud included in the survey were generally higher 
for individuals under 65 years old than for those 65 and older. Additionally, individuals over 
55 years old were also found less likely to have been victimized in the two prior surveys of the 
organization (Anderson, 2013).  
On the other hand, other research, specially on specific types of fraud, have yielded 
different results.  In Lee and Soberon-Ferrer (1997)’s analysis of the data from the American 
Association of Retired Persons (AARP) (1993)’s Survey of Older Consumer Behavior, they 
found that older consumers were at higher risk of being victimized. Their results from an 
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ordered logit analysis showed that 17% of young respondents fell under the lowest vulnerability 
group while only 6% of their older counterparts were in the same group. In contrast, only 7% 
percent of the young respondents belonged to the highly vulnerable group whereas the older 
consumers amounted to 25% of that group. Likewise, AARP’s (1996) results from a survey 
with 745 victims of telemarketing fraud show that older consumers had a higher likelihood of 
being victimized by telemarketing fraud than younger consumers. While people 50 and older 
comprised only 36% of the general population, they constituted 56% percent of the victims (in 
Titus & Gover, 2001). Another study on the determinants of victimization by different types of 
advance fee schemes found that individuals over 65 years old were more likely to fall victim to 
“other advance fee scams” which included lottery scams, whereas individuals 45-54 years old 
were more likely to be victimized by “dating scams” such as relationship scams, and those 18-
24 were more likely to fall victim to “online transaction scams”  such as charity and job offer 
scams (Ross and Smith, 2011). The results from AARP’s 2011 Foundation National Fraud 
Victim Study also supports that older consumers are more vulnerable to specific types of fraud. 
They found victims of lottery fraud, investment fraud, and prescription drug/identity theft fraud 
to be significantly older than the general population (Pak and Shadel, 2011). 
As Deevy et al. (2012) identified, older consumers seem to be less victimized in general 
studies across all fraud types, whereas higher proportions of older victims are found in studies 
that have examined victims by fraud type such as investment, lottery, and telemarketing fraud. 
One explanation for these trends may lie in the data collection methods and reporting behavior 
(Pak and Shadel, 2007; 2011) beyond the scope of this paper. However, one exception was 
found in Schoepfer and Piquero’s (2009) study, which suggested that younger consumers are 
more likely to be victimized even when predicting specific types of fraud. Therefore, the role 




• Risk-Seeking, Loss Aversion, Impulsivity and Fraud Victimization 
“Another important characteristic of fraud victimization is the victim’s own 
facilitation. Victims make the initial contact or take steps that lead to the initial 
contact…” (Schoepfer & Piquero, 2009) 
Wyk and Benson (1997) suggest that the lifestyle theory of crime victimization can be 
applied to fraud victimization. According to this theory, being targeted by criminal offenders is 
a necessary factor in falling victim to fraud. Wyk and Benson (1997) found that even though 
they did not necessarily become fraud victims, the people more likely to report being the target 
of fraud were those who also reported greater willingness to take financial risks. Because “what 
appears to matter most in determining successful victimization is receiving an attempt in the 
first place,” (Wyk and Benson 1997) individuals with favorable attitude towards risk-taking 
increase their likelihood of being successfully victimized due to increased exposure to fraud 
perpetrators. Using the National Public Survey’s data by the National White-Collar Crime 
Center, Schoepfer and Piquero (2009) found a significant positive effect of engagement in risky 
behavior on fraud victimization. In addition to predicting general victimization, risk-taking 
positively and significantly predicted likelihood of victimization by specific types of scams 
such as free prize fraud and 800/900 number fraud. A study on the risk of cyber-crime 
victimization of users of Social Network Systems (SNS), found that risk propensity, measured 
by willingness to take and assume risks, positively affects SNS’s user’s risk of cyber-crime 
victimization (Saridakis et al., 2016). Titus and Gover (2001) also list tendency towards risk-
taking behavior as a character trait that can increase one’s vulnerability not only to fraud 
victimization, but also to revictimization. 
In some studies of fraud victimization, risk-taking has also been used as a proxy for 
impulsivity or low self-control, which have been found to positively affect fraud victimization. 
For instance, when analyzing the effect of “remote purchasing” and self-control on risk of being 
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targeted and victimized, Holtfreter et al. (2008) measured self-control by willingness to take 
financial risks. Contrarily to Wyk and Benson (1997), they found that low self-control, or 
greater willingness to take financial risks, does not affect whether consumers are targeted, but 
does significantly increase consumer’s likelihood of falling victim to fraud. Another study with 
victims and age-matched non-victims of investment fraud, however, found that both group’s 
risk preferences did not significantly differ (Knutson and Samanez-Larkin, 2014). This study 
did find differences in impulsiveness, with victims reporting higher impulsiveness, particularly 
regarding not planning. More direct measures of impulsivity have also been studied with respect 
to fraud victimization following Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990)’s self-control theory (in 
Wilsem, 2013). In an assessment of the characteristics of victims of online consumer fraud, 
using survey data among the Dutch general population, Wilsem (2013) found both direct and 
indirect effects of low self-control on internet consumer fraud. The study’s results suggest that 
apart from the independent relationship between victimization and low self-control, consumers 
who are more impulsive are more susceptible to such crimes due to their higher engagement in 
“risk-enhancing internet activities.”  Pratt et al.’s (2014) more recent meta-analysis supports 
the existence of a positive relationship between low self-control and victimization. 
• Mate-acquisition motive, Risk-seeking/Loss aversion and Impulsivity 
A functional hypothesis of past conditions poses that due to frequently living on survival 
mode, putting more effort to avoid losses than to acquire gains lent ancestral humans a better 
chance of enduring. Put simply, overabundance was nice, but insufficiency could be deadly 
(Kenrick et al., 2012). The modern evolutionary approach extends this hypothesis as a function 
of fundamental motives. The fundamental motives framework suggests rather than a cognitive 
bias, loss aversion allowed humans to solve ancestral challenges crucial for survival. It is argued 
that loss aversion is present when people are motivated to protect themselves whereas it is gone 
when people are motivated to acquire a mate (Kenrick et al, 2012; Li et al. (2012) in 
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Griskevicius and Kenrick, 2013). Furthermore, the mate acquisition motive affects women and 
men differently. While under the influence of this motive both want to draw attention and 
standout, they do so in different manners. In men, it leads to more risk-seeking (Kenrick et al., 
2012; Baker and Maner (2008), Knutson et al. (2008) in Griskevicius, Kenrick, 2013), more 
impulsiveness (Wilson & Daly (2004) in Griskevicius and Kenrick, 2013), and not only 
reduces, but might reverse loss aversion (gains loom larger than losses) (Kenrick et al., 2012; 
Li et al. (2012) in Griskevicius, Kenrick, 2013).  One explanation for this is that due to females’ 
higher selectivity in choosing mates (Li and Kenrick (2006) in Kenrick et al., 2012), males 
ought to indirectly (e.g. conspicuous buying) or directly outcompete other males in an attempt 
to be selected as mates. Therefore, when primed to think about mating, taking risks helps males 
since a high level of loss aversion would defy the purpose when competing with other males 
for a mate (Kenrick et al., 2012). Women, on the other hand, do not become openly risky like 
men when primed by the mate acquisition motives, except when taking risk enhances their 
appearance. For instance, women with a mating motive are more willing to risk getting cancer 
from tanning their bodies (Hill & Durante (2011) in Griskevicius, Kenrick, 2013). Hence, I also 
explored whether gender moderated the mating motive effect on impulsivity and risk attitudes. 
Methodology 
• Hypothesis Development 
As Griskevicius and Kenrick (2013) suggested, different motivational systems may 
influence individuals differently throughout their life stages. The mate acquisition system, they 
suggest, has more influence on teenagers and young adults because it coincides with the mate-
acquisition stage. Based on the literature discussed thus far, there is a link between the mating 
motives and risk-seeking and impulsivity, which increase the likelihood of sucessful 
victimization. Therefore, in order to explain individual differences in vulnerability to fraud 
victimization from this standpoint, this study was carried out under the following hypotheses: 
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H1: The mate-acquisition motive has more influence on young adults than in old adults. 
Therefore, when primed by mate-acquisition motive, risk-seeking and impulsiveness are higher, 
and loss aversion is lower  for young adults than for old adults. 
H2: As they are more risk-seeking, less loss averse and  more impulsive than old adults, young 
adults have a higher likelihood of being victimized when primed by mate-acquisition motive. 
Griskevicius and Kenrick (2013) argue that “due to inherent sex differences in parental 
investment, the motivation to acquire mates could diminish the bias for losses to outweigh gains 
in men, but not women.” Since loss-aversion hinders willingness to take risks, this goes in line 
with Kenrick et al.’s (2012) accounts that when primed by this motive, females do not become 
as risky as males, which led to the following hypothesis of this study: 
H3: As they are more risk-seeking, less loss averse and  more impulsive, males have higher 
likelihood of being victimized than females when primed by mate-acquisition motive. 
• Data Collection and Measures 
The data for this study was collected through a survey admistered on Qualtrics platform. I 
ran two experiments: the first experiment investigated the victim’s side (two between-subject 
conditions: mate acquisition motive and control groups) and the second experiment investigated 
the perpetrator’s side (two between-subject conditions: targeting a young adult or targeting an 
old adult). Participants were directed randomly to one of the experiments, and within the 
experiment they were allocated randomly to conditions. The questionnaires encompassed fraud 
scenarios, demographic, and financial decision-making questions. 
Experiment 1 
119  participants completed this study on a voluntary basis (Mage = 28.21; SD = 8.61; 
% male: 38.66). To measure fraud victimzation, participants were first primed with one of the 
conditions. Participants in the mate acquisition group (N=61, Mage=27, SD=7.15; % male: 
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37.70) watched a clip from the movie “Things to Do in Denver When You’re Dead”, which 
prior research has shown to elicit the desired effect (Cantin et al. (1995) in Maner et al., 2005). 
Participants in the control group (N=58, Mage=29, SD=9.86; % male: 39.66), watched a neutral 
clip of similar length from the same movie. Immediately after the manipulation, 
participantsanswered an hypothetical telemarketing/prize fraud scenario adapted from 
Holtfreter et al. (2010). Participants rated the likelihood that they would pay a $25 advance fee 
to claim a voucher  for an all inclusive trip to to Hawaii in the US with a friend scale 
(1=Extrememly unlikely, 7=Extremely likely). As noted by Holtfreter et al. (2010), although 
the answers to this scenario do not equate actual fraud victimization, they represent participants’ 
willingness to engage with strangers and provide them personal information over the phone, 
thus, cooperating with a potential scammer, which is a necessary condition for actual 
victimization. Unlike Holtfreter et al. (2010), a follow-up question to this scenario asked 
respondents who were slightly to extremely unlikely to pay the advance fee the amount that 
would make them at least slightly likely to pay it. This was to observe whether respondents that 
rejected paying the fee did so because they suspected or recognized a fraud attempt or simply 
thought the advance fee was too high. Therefore, unless participants answered that they would 
be slightly to extremely unlikely and would not pay any amount (inserted $0) as advance fee, 
the fraud attempt scenario was considered successful. Risk-seeking and loss-aversion were 
measured by two methods adapted from Kahnemen and Tvesrky (1997) (in Kahneman, 2011). 
Participants were presented the choice of a sure payment or a non-mixed gamble with the same 
positive expected value. Participants who chose the gamble were considered risk-seekers 
(risks=1). For loss aversion, participants were asked whether they would accept a mixed gamble 
(where a loss and a gain are possible) with a positive outcome. If participants rejected the 
gamble, they were considered loss averse (lossav=1). Then, loss aversion ratio was measured 
as a continuous value. The average value estimated from many experiments ranges from 1.5 to 
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2.5, meaning that people weight losses more than gains. Then, a loss aversion ratio of 1 means 
that an individual is risk-neutral or indifferent, and any value bellow 1 means that the individual 
is risk-seeking (Kahneman, 2011). Impulsivity was measured by asking respondents to rate 
their level of  agreement with the five statements, presented in Table 1, adapted from Gammicks 
et al. (1993)’s self-control scale on a five-point Likert scale (1=Totally disagree to 5=Totally 
agree) as in Kimpe et al. (2018).  Age was measured as a continuous variable and gender as a 
categorical variable (male=1). Because of concerns that the Italian movie clip would produce a 
different reaction for Italian individuals because their culture was, perhaps, stereotypically 
portrayed, participant’s nationalities were collected in order to detect it if such was the case. 
Furthermore, participants were asked whether they were parents to control for parenthood 
because age is not an exact indication of life-stage (1=Yes, 2=Adopting or expecting, 3=No). 
There might be overlap between young adults who are already in the parenting stage and may 
be out of the mate-acquisition stage and old adults not yet in the parenting stage, but still in the 
mate-acquisition stage. 
Result Analysis and Discussion  
Because risk-seeking measured by the non-mixed gambling task did not provide enough 
variability in the results in both groups, the analysis was carried out only with the loss aversion 
ratio measure. Also, no Italians participated in Experiment 1, thus, nationality was no used in 
the analysis. To conduct the analysis, correlations between the independent variables and 
dependent variables were computed first. Since age, children and loss aversion ratio do not 
follow a normal distribution and all other variables are non-parametric, Spearman rank 
correlations were computed. Then, the mediator and moderator analysis were performed, 
followed by multivariate analysis.  
o Mediator and Moderator Analysis 
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Impulsivity. The impulsivity scale used in this study was reliable (α=0.73). First, a two-
sample t-test was conducted to determine if mean impulsivity differed between conditions. The 
test showed that there was not a statistically significant difference in impulsivity between these 
two groups (t=-0.056, df=117, p=0.52). In fact, the values (2.82) for both groups were 
essentially the same. Then, an OLS regression was performed on condition (group) including 
age as a moderator (βgroup=0, βage=0, βgroupxage= 0). It was expected that the effect of a mating 
motive would be higher for young adults than for old adults. However, condition remained 
statistically non-significant as was its interaction with age (F=0.21; df= 115, p>0.05). 
Therefore, these results do not support this study’s hypothesis (H1). Furthermore, it was 
expected that a mating prime would have a lower effect on impulsivity for females. Therefore, 
another regression was performed on condition with gender as a moderator variable (βgroup=-
0.04, βgender=0.26, βgroupxgender=0.10). Again, the interaction between condition and gender was 
statistically non-significant as were the individual variables (F=0.17, df=115, p>0.05).  Hence, 
these results do not provide enough evidence for this study’s hypothesis (H3).  
Loss Aversion. The results from a two-way table, show no statistical difference between 
loss aversion prevalence in these two groups (mating group N=53, control group N=44; 
F=0.095, df=1, p>0.05). Likewise, a logistic regression showed that condition (β=0.75) was not 
statistically significant in predicting loss aversion likelihood (χ2=2.42, df=1, p>0.05). Another 
logistic regression was performed to include the interaction between condition (group) and age. 
The results suggest that as age increases, likelihood of being loss averse when primed by a 
mating motive also increases, which is in line with the hypothesis that younger individuals 
would become less loss averse when primed by a mating motive. None of the variables (βage=-
0.03, βgroup=-0.06, βgroupxage=0.03) reached statistical significance, however (χ
2=3.39, df=3, 
p>0.05). Therefore, H1 cannot be supported statistically. The results for the loss aversion 
measure also show that while they comprise 39.66 % of the sample, 56.52 % of males in the 
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control group were loss averse whereas 88.57% of females were. In the manipulated group, 
where males comprise 37.70%, loss aversion prevalence increased to 78.26 % for males and 
92.11% for females. When interacting condition with gender in the logistic regression, the 
results also show that females primed by a mating condition have a higher likelihood of being 
loss averse and for males, that likelihood is even higher (βgroup=0.41, βgender=-1.79, 
βgroupxgender=0.61). Thus, while these results are aligned with the expectation that a mating prime 
would have higher influence on males, the direction of the effect is opposite to that expected: 
reduced, or even inverted in males, loss aversion. However, while gender was statistically 
significant, condition and the interaction term were not (χ2=12.49, df=3, p<0.05). Hence, there 
is not enough evidence neither against nor supporting H3. 
Loss Aversion Ratio. As loss aversion ratio was positively skewed, a logarithmic 
transformation was applied. Then, loss aversion ratio was regressed on condition. The results 
show that, as expected, a mating motive decreases loss aversion ratio by 43%. However, these 
results were non-significant (F=2.45, df=117, p>0.05). Age differences were then tested. 
Although non-significant (F=0.97, df=115, p>0.05), the results from this regression were 
surprising as they suggest that loss aversion ratio increases with age but decreases with age 
when a mating motive is active (βgroup=0.52, βage=0.02, βgroupxage=-0.03). Nevertheless, there is 
not enough evidence to support nor reject H1.  
As I expected risk-seeking to increase in males but not as much, if at all, in females, 
gender was then tested as a moderator. All variables in this regression were significant in 
explaining loss aversion ratio (βgroup=-0.88, βgender=-1.68, βgroupxgender=1.11). Surprisingly, the 
effect of a mating prime was not only higher for females, but also in a direction opposite to that 
expected in males. For males, a mating motive caused loss aversion ratio to increase by 22.8%, 
suggesting less willingness to take risks while it reduced by 88% in females, suggesting higher 
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willingness to take risks (F=9.01, df=115, p<0.05). For males, these results suggest that loss 
aversion may be a domain-general bias.  
Victimization. First, I analyzed whether mating motive affected victimization. A Chi-
square statistic test showed no statistical difference in victimization between both conditions 
(χ2=0.44, df=1, p>0.05). When analyzing the possible mediating effect of impulsivity (imp), 
victimization was first regressed on impulsivity (β=0.22) to check if there was a zero-order 
relationship, which was not found to be statistically significant (χ2=0.80, df=1, p>0.05). Then, 
a logistic regression of victimization on condition (β=-0.12) and impulsivity (β=0.22) was also 
not statistically significant (χ2=0.91, df=2, p>0.05). When age was tested as a moderator on the 
previous regression (βgroup=-1.97, βage=-0.07, βgroupxage=0.06, βimp=0.20), it became the only 
significant predictor, suggesting victimization likelihood decreases with age. However, the 
interaction factor and the full model were non-significant (χ2=5.95, df=4, p>0.05). Including 
gender as a moderator (βgroup=-0.43, βgender=-0.63, βgroupxgender=0.78, βimp=0.25) also did not 
produce significant results (χ2=2.30, df=4, p>0.05).  
The same procedure was followed to analyze possible mediating effects of loss aversion 
(lossav) and loss aversion ratio (lossavr). There was no significant zero-order relationship 
between loss aversion (β=0.67) and victimization (χ2=1.96, df=1, p>0.05). Adding loss aversion 
to the hierarchical equation (βgroup=-0.21, βlossav=0.71) produced no significant associations 
(χ2=2.25, df=2, p>0.05) as neither did adding gender (βgroup=-0.47, βgender=-0.36, 
βgroupxgender=0.68, βlossav=0.66) as moderator (χ
2=3.03, df=4, p>0.05). When interaction of 
condition with age was included, age became negatively associated with victimization and 
marginally significant (p<0.10), but the model (βgroup=-1.94, βage=-0.07, βgroupxage=0.06, 
βlossav=0.62) was non-significant (χ
2=6.91, df=4, p>0.05). Loss aversion ratio (β=0) was also 
not significantly associated with victimization, but the model (βconstant=0.47) was significant 
(χ2=4.21, df=1, p<0.05). Regression of on loss aversion ratio (β=0) and condition (β=-0.23) 
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resulted in a non-significant model (χ2=0.59, df=2, p>0.05) as did subsequent addition of gender 
as moderator (βgroup=-0.71, βgender=-0.92, βgroupxgender=1.08, βlossavr=-0.01) (χ
2=7.12, df=4, 
p>0.05). Only age became marginally significant (p<0.1) when included as a moderator 
(βgroup=-1.92, βage=-0.07, βgroupxage=0.06, βlossavr=0), with likelihood of victimization decreasing 
with age. The model was also marginally significant (χ2=9.27, df=4, p>0.05). Overall, there is 
no statistical support for an effect of mating motives on victimization and neither for mediating 
effects of the theoretical variables nor for moderator effects of age and gender (H2, H3) 
although the effect of age on victimization was as expected in these regression models. 
o Multivariate Analysis 
Finally, four multivariate analysis were performed to investigate the issues above: 
Effect of mating motive on 1) impulsivity, 2) loss aversion, 3) loss aversion ratio, all with age 
and gender as moderators, and 4) Effect of impulsivity, loss aversion and loss aversion ratio on 
victimization. Logistic regressions were performed for 2 and 4 and OLS regressions for 1 and 
3 (Table 2). The variable Children was included as a control in the multivariate analysis because 
it captures whether one is in the parenting stage, which is expected to weaken the influence of 
the mate acquisition motive. From the Spearman correlations, Parenthood is significantly and 
highly correlated with Children (-0.94). Hence, only number of children was included in the 
regression to avoid collinearity. Although Parenthood and number of children is also 
significantly correlated with age (-0.39 and 0.44, respectively) as assumed (older people in 
parenting stage, younger people still in mating stage), these relationships are weaker. Therefore, 
both variables are included in the regressions. The same regressions where also performed 
excluding participants who answered the question about the movie clip incorrectly (Table 3). 
Impulsivity. As observed in Tables 2 and 3, there is a relationship between loss aversion 
and impulsivity. Loss aversion (β=-0.44) significantly reduces impulsivity, which is consistent 
with the fact that impulsive people tend to engage more in risky behavior. While gender 
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(β=0.26) was marginally significant in predicting impulsivity in Table 2, suggesting that males 
are slightly more impulsive than females, this relationship was non-significant in Table 3. The 
opposite occurred for age (β=-0.02), which was only marginally significant in Table 3, 
suggesting that older people are less impulsive. As age and gender were not significant as 
moderators, the interaction factors were removed from this regression. 
Loss Aversion. As seen in the regressions for impulsivity, less impulsive people (β=-
0.89) have higher likelihood of being loss averse (Table 2). However, when people who 
answered the question about the movie clip incorrectly were excluded, this relationship (β=-
0.75) became non-significant. The results from both Tables 2 and 3 show a significant 
relationship between likelihood of being loss averse and loss aversion ratio (β=0.35 and β=0.81, 
respectively) in the expected direction. Since higher loss aversion ratios correspond to higher 
loss aversion, the higher the loss aversion ratio, the higher the odds of being loss averse. For 
risk-seeking and risk-neutral individuals, this means shifting from a loss aversion ratio of less 
than or equal to 1, respectively, to a loss aversion ratio greater than 1. Mating motive (β=1.29) 
was only partially significant in Table 3, suggesting that a mating prime increases the likelihood 
of being loss averse. Age, gender, and corresponding interactions (removed), and number of 
children were not significantly associated with loss aversion. 
Loss Aversion Ratio. There is a significant association between loss aversion and loss 
aversion ratio, where in Tables 2 and 3, loss averse people have loss aversion ratios 111% and 
128% higher than those who are not, respectively. The full sample regression suggests that a 
mating motive reduces loss aversion ratio by 90% in females and, unlike in the mediator 
analysis, it also reduces males’ loss aversion ratio, although only by 4% in males, suggesting 
that a mating motive encourages risk-seeking. Additionally, males with a mating motive have 
loss aversion ratios 56% lower than females while in the control group males have 142% lower 
loss aversion ratios than females. The interaction factor between condition and gender was, 
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however, only marginally significant. Hence, these results are not fully supported statistically. 
In the reduced sample, mating motive (56% reduction) becomes only marginally significant 
with no gender effects, and males have loss aversion ratios 79% lower than females in general. 
Age differences were not significant in any of the regressions and were, therefore, removed. 
Victimization. Differently from the mediation analysis, where no association was found 
between victimization and the theoretical variables, the results from Tables 2 and 3 agree that 
whether individuals are loss averse is the only significant (marginally in Table 2) predictor of 
victimization. A striking surprise is that these results suggest that if one is loss averse, one has 
a higher likelihood of being a victim. It is possible that in this study’s fraud scenario, people 
identified passing on an opportunity to save for a trip as a loss, which loss averse people seek 
to minimize. Neither age nor gender effects were found. 
Variables Variables
Impulsivity -0.89 ** 0.04 0.36 Impulsivity -0.75 -0.05 0.22
(0.4) (0.15) (0.28) (0.48) (0.16) (0.34)
[0.41] [1.44] [0.47] [1.25]
Loss aversion -0.44 ** 1.11 *** 0.95 * Loss aversion -0.43 ** 1.28 *** 1.61 **
(0.18) (0.35) (0.55) (0.21) (0.26) (0.67)
[2.58] [5.00]
Loss aversion ratio 0 0.35 ** -0.01 Loss aversion ratio 0 0.81 ** -0.011
(0.00) (0.16) (0.08) (0.00) (0.41) (0.01)
[1.43] [0.99] [2.25] [0.99]
Condition 0.04 0.77 -0.90 ** -0.5 Condition 0.1 1.29 * -0.56 * -0.82
(0.14) (0.56) (0.35) (0.42) (0.16) (0.72) (0.30) (0.54)
[2.15] [0.61] [3.65] [0.44]
ConditionxGender 0.86 * ConditionxGender
(0.49)
Age -0.015 -0.03 0.03 * -0.01 Age -0.02 * -0.02 0.03 -0.02
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
[0.97] [0.99] [0.98] [0.98]
Gender 0.26 * -0.76 -1.42 *** -0.26 Gender 0.26 -0.95 -0.79 *** -0.37
(0.15) (0.52) (0.36) (0.45) (0.18) (0.74) (0.26) (0.55)
[0.47] [0.77] [0.39] [0.69]
Children 0.13 0.12 -0.38 * -0.73 Children 0.18 0.08 0.38 -1.03
(0.15) (0.53) (0.22) (0.48) (0.17) (0.59) (0.25) (0.62)
[1.12] [0.48] [1.08] [0.36]
Constant 3.46 *** 4.09 ** 0.32 -0.42 Constant 3.58 2.5 0.35 -0.05
(0.46) (1.73) (0.78) (1.36) (0.34) (2.05) (0.83) (1.64)
Model F/ Chi2 2.29 ** 30.76 *** 7.12 *** 14.64 ** Model F/Chi2 1.86 * 35.51 *** 9.71 *** 20.09 ***
Adj/Peseudo R2 0.06 0.27 0.25 0.09 Adj/Pseudo R2 0.05 0.39 0.26 0.17


































As being targeted is indispensable for being victimized even though it does not 
necessarily lead to successful victimization, the likelihood that young and old adults would be 
targeted was analyzed. It was an exploratory analysis to observe whether young adults are more 
likely to be targeted. 116 participants (Mage=27.4, SD=9.6, % male: 38.8) were in this 
experiment. A perpetrator version of the victimization scenario presented earlier was allocated 
to two different groups. In this version, participants were the ones making the call and were 
told that that was their job as part of a fraudulent organization and that they operated on an 
individual daily quota of successful victimization. Furthermore, they were told that they had 
missed their daily quota for the previous seven days and risked being fired if they did not meet 
their quota that day. One group (N=58, Mage=28.3, SD=10.4, % male: 44.8) was presented the 
choice to call a young adult as opposed to a random number and asked the likelihood that they 
would prefer to target the young adult while the other group (N=58, Mage=26.5, SD=8.7, % 
male: 32.8) had the same choice and answered the scenario with respect to targeting an old 
adult. They were finally asked how old they imagined their allocated demographic to be. 
Result Analysis and Discussion 
Mean likelihood of targeting young and old adults were 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. These 
low scores reflect a floor effect, which may be due to social desirability bias.  Those targeting 
young adults imagined them to be 21.1 years old (SD=3.3) while those targeting old adults 
imagined them to be 65.2 years old on average (SD=14.7). The result from an ordered logistic 
regression on the age the participants imagined their allocated group to be showed that age (β=-
0.01) affected the likelihood of being targeted negatively and only marginally significantly 
(χ2=2.92, df=1, p>0.05). Another regression on the condition (young=1) participants were in 
showed no significant effect on likelihood of being targeted (β=0.40). Both regressions suggest 
20 
 
that young adults are more likely to be targeted, however, the non-significant results suggest 
that, especially for types of fraud such as telemarketing, targeting is usually random. 
General Discussion 
The results above, from the mediating and moderator analysis and the multivariate 
analysis, showed that loss aversion ratio was the only potential mediator affected by condition. 
Furthermore, there were gender effects in that relationship. While in the mediator analysis 
males’ loss aversion ratio increased, males’ loss aversion ratio reduced in the multivariate 
analysis. Differently from the multivariate analysis, the result from the moderator analysis was 
statistically supported, suggesting that when primed to acquire a mate, males value financial 
losses even more than gains. In the broader Fundamental Motives context, this may suggest that 
for males, loss aversion is not only a self-protection domain bias, but also a mating and, perhaps, 
domain-general bias. Alternatively, level of loss aversion may depend more on the context it is 
applied than in the motive. More studies could investigate the effect of other motives on males’ 
financial decision-making risk attitude to see whether loss aversion ratio also increases, thus 
highlighting the role of context. Also, unlike Kenrick et al. (2012), it was found that a mating 
motive had a higher impact on females, which was surprising since the risk-taking measure 
does not affect their appearance. Nevertheless, loss aversion ratio did not show a mediation 
effect because not only did it not affect victimization, but also no relationship was found 
between condition and victimization. Since no association between condition was found with 
impulsivity and loss aversion and, as mentioned, condition did not affect victimization, the 
results failed to show any mediation effects. It was found, however, that loss aversion increases 
likelihood of being a fraud victim. This differs from the literature discussed in this paper as 
being loss averse gives place to risk-averse choices (Kahneman, 2011), and this study found a 
negative relationship between loss aversion and impulsivity. It is risk-seeking and impulsivity 
that have been linked to higher victimization likelihood. Nevertheless, these results do not 
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invalidate previous studies (e.g. Wyk and Mason, 2001; Knutson and Samanez-Larkin, 2014) 
on the link of risky behavior and/or impulsivity with fraud victimization as the impact of these 
factors may vary with specific types of fraud as Schoepfer and Piquero (2009) found. This 
study’s victimization measure is not global, only suggesting that risk-seeking and impulsivity 
may not explain victimization by telemarketing/free prize fraud. A purely speculative 
explanation for this loss aversion effect on victimization is that, perhaps in the fraud scenario, 
participants identified foregone savings in the event they did not pay the fee as a loss compared 
to keeping their money as a gain. Since loss averse people seek to minimize losses and weight 
them more heavily than gains, they could pay the fee in order to avoid missing on that much 
savings for a potential trip. It would be interesting to ask participants whether they intended to 
go on a trip in the near future to see if that was a contributing factor. This result has implications 
for detecting nature of the messages in fraudulent schemes and techniques that fraudsters may 
use to take advantage of loss aversion in people.  
From the perpetrator measure, no age demographic was found more likely to be 
targeted.  Some participants, however, may have not been able to put themselves in the fraud 
scenario. Individuals’ levels of Machiavellianism may affect the ability and ease with which 
they do so and, therefore, affect their responses. Moreover, in addition to possible desirability 
bias, there may still be place for morality in situations such as that described in the scenario, 
which may also be reflected in the floor effect. Finally, consistent with general definition of old 
adulthood, participants attributed old adults an average of 65 years old. As this study did not 
have many participants around and above that age, it cannot provide conclusions for 
comparisons between young and old adults, but more appropriately for young adults and adults.  
Conclusion 
Building from the Fundamental Motive Framework and fraud victimization studies, the 
present study aimed to analyze the mediating effects of impulsivity and risky behavior on fraud 
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victimization resulting from motivation to solve an evolutionary challenge: mate acquisition. It 
sought to investigate how these effects differed in young and old adulthood in order to identify 
high risk individuals and inform optimal targeting of information dissemination and protective 
measures. It was expected that a mating motive would increase males’ impulsiveness and 
willingness to take risks and, therefore, their likelihood of falling victim to fraud, and would 
have little to no effect on females. Furthermore, the effect of the mating motive was expected 
to be larger for young adults than for old adults given that young adults are in the mating stage 
of life. The results did not provide enough statistical evidence for those hypotheses. Except for 
loss aversion ratio, which acted in an opposite direction than that expected, a mating prime did 
not significantly alter any of the theoretical variables, and loss aversion was the only significant 
predictor of victimization. Along with the perpetrator’s perspective, this study suggests that a 
mating motive does not render any age demographic more vulnerable to fraud neither directly 
nor through mediation of impulsive and risky behavior. Contrary to studies that found a 
correlation between age and victimization (e.g. wyk and Benson, 1997; Schoepfer and Piquero, 
2009), this study reinforces that the effect of age on victimization may vary by fraud type and 
is still inconclusive. This study is also, to my best knowledge, the first to contribute to this 
literature by combining the Fundamental Motives Framework with self-control theory to study 
fraud victimization, thus providing new avenues for research. 
Limitations and Future Research 
The present study has some limitations. Firstly, although the priming mechanism used 
has been proven to be effective in previous studies, in this study it was used remotely and there 
was no means of ensuring that participants paid attention to the entirety of the movie clip. This 
was partly accounted for by including a question about the clip and a time requirement before 
respondents could advance to the next question. However, for participants that did not answer 
it correctly, it is not possible to know whether they did not pay attention and, consequently, 
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were not primed or they simply did not remember. If the second is the case, then memory could 
be included in the regressions instead of being used as a filter. Another noteworthy component 
of this study is that the risk-seeking measure was framed as gains. That may be one reason that 
I did not find variability as Tversky and Kahneman (1979) have shown that people tend to be 
loss averse in the gains domain while they tend to be risk-seeking in the losses domain (in 
Kahneman, 2011). This suggests that prevention and promotion frames may have different 
effects on people. For types of fraud were safety or prevention of losses is promoted (e.g. 
confirm personal and credit card via email or phone), risk attitude could differ from that when 
the fraud tactic promotes a gain (e.g. fee prize, high financial returns on investment). Therefore, 
future research could investigate if young adults become more risk-seeking in the losses domain 
than old adults when primed by a mating motive. In addition, future studies may investigate 
whether mating motives affect risk-taking and impulsivity differently in different contexts. For 
instance, a mating frame of mind may affect people’s physical risky behavior, but not their 
financial risk attitude. Certain risky behaviors may be more closely related to victimization by 
certain types of fraud. I would not expect physical risk attitude to affect investment fraud 
victimization. Finally, since the Fundamental Motives Framework poses that individuals’ 
choices may differ as a function of the active fundamental motive, future research could 
investigate the effect of other fundamental motive domains (e.g. self-protection) on risk 
attitudes and impulsivity as mediators of victimization, and provide longitudinal studies to 
understand whether the effect of fundamental motives changes with age or is constant until and 
after an individual goes to another life stage. 
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